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Second, the Supreme Court noted that the primary factor in
determining whether an irrigation district owes a duty to a damaged
plaintiff is whether it was foreseeable that a district's acts or omissions
would pose a risk of injury to the plaintiff. According to the court,
testimony at trial clearly demonstrated that overland flooding from the
Clark Fork River generally and due to ice jams was uncommon. As
such, the risk of damage to the Gaudreau facility from overland
flooding from the Clark Fork River was not foreseeable. Therefore,
the Supreme Court held that CID had no duty to erect or maintain
flood control measures on their system to protect the Gaurdreau
facility.
Third, the Supreme Court agreed with the findings of the district
court that no evidence existed to suggest that CID failed to exercise
reasonable care in the maintenance of their system. According to the
Supreme Court, Gaudreau and Montelius were relying in their appeal
of this issue on evidence that was clearly controverted at trial. As such,
the Supreme Court held that CID exercised reasonable care in the
maintenance of its system.
Fourth, the Supreme Court noted that the precedent on which
Gaudreau and Montelius were relying to impose a duty to warn on CID
required CID to have foreknowledge of the hazard or to have created
the hazard. According to the Supreme Court, overland flooding due
to ice jams was already established as unforeseeable and was created by
a mix of circumstances out of the control of CID. As such, CID did not
have a duty to warn Gaudreau and Montelius of the overland flooding
due to the ice jams.
Matthewj Costinett
In re Deadman's Basin Water Users Ass'n, 40 P.3d 387 (Mont. 2002)
(holding that the district court erred as a matter of law when it
prohibited irrigation from Deadman's Basin Reservoir in a manner
contrary to the water purchase contract).
In 2000, Wiley Micks contracted with Deadman's Basin Water
Users Association to purchase the right to 775 acre-feet of water from
the Deadman's Basin Reservoir ("Reservoir"). Micks depended on the
water to irrigate his hay crop. The hay crop was important to
sustaining the animals at the genetic materials facility he operated.
The water purchase contract provided for a pro rata reduction in water
distribution in the event an inadequate amount of water existed to
satisfy the outstanding water purchase contracts.
On its own motion, the Fourteenth Judicial District Court,
Musselshell County, found that the water level in Deadman's Basin
Reservoir had reached "a critically low level." The district court
decided that the reservoir water should be used to maintain the
Musselshell River flow, which supplied domestic, municipal, stock and
wildlife water usage. On August 2, 2000, the district court issued an
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order effective August 12, 2000, through September 30, 2000, which
prohibited the irrigation of crops from the Deadman's Basin
Reservoir.
The district court's order contradicted the pro rata reduction in
water distribution set forth in section one of the Deadman's Basin
water purchase contract, and prevented Micks from irrigating his hay
crop. Micks continued to irrigate his hay crop with the reservoir water,
and the district court found Micks to be in violation of the order.
Micks moved the court to reconsider its August 2, 2000 order, issue a
temporary restraining order, and issue a preliminary injunction. The
district court denied the motion, and Micks appealed to the Supreme
Court of Montana. On appeal, the decision was reversed and
remanded.
Micks set forth two arguments to show why the August 2, 2000
order did not apply to him. First, he maintained that the water he
used to irrigate his crop came from a system that was not connected to
the Musselshell River. Second, Micks argued that the right to the
Reservoir water should not be appropriated to the municipality to his
detriment.
The district court's order contravened the terms in section one of
the water purchase contract. The Supreme Court of Montana found
that the district court erred when it made the determination that
domestic appropriation of the Reservoir water was a higher priority
than Micks' use for irrigation purposes. Because language of
contractual provisions should be interpreted according to its plain,
ordinary meaning, and because the language in section one of the
water purchase contract is unambiguous regarding the outstanding
distribution of water in the event there is an insufficient supply in the
Reservoir, the district court was bound to those terms as written.
Melissa L. Gordon
NEBRASKA
Jurgensmier Farms, Inc. v. Kearney Cty., No. A-00-564, 2001 WL
968062 (Neb. App. Aug. 28, 2001) (granting injunctive relief and
damages resulting from Kearney County wrongfully blocking a natural
drainageway by raising a county road).
Jurgensmier Farms, Inc. ('jurgensmier") brought this case on
appeal from a district court decision denying injunctive relief and
damages against Kearney County ("County"). Jurgensmier purchased
land ("property") for farming in 1967. In 1979, the county decided to
raise the county road that bordered the Jurgensmier Farm to the east.
At that time, Jurgensmier expressed concern that the raising of the
road would impede the natural drainage from the property.
After the county raised the road, Jurgensmier experienced water

